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COMMENT, UNITED STATES V PTASYNSKI:

A WINDFALL FOR CONGRESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

[The power of Congress to collect taxes from the states] is a power,
sir, to burden us with a standing army of ravenous collectors-harpies, perhaps, from another state, but who, however, were never
known to have bowels for any purpose but to fatten on the lifeblood of the people. In an age or two, this will be the case; and
when the Congress shall become tyranical, these vultures, their servants, will be the tyrants of the village, by whose presence all freedom of speech and action will be taken away.'
This fear, stated so vitriolically in 1787, no doubt constituted a prophecy fulfilled when viewed through the eyes of the plaintiffs challenging the
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 19802 (Act) in United States v. Pasynski.3 Substantively, the complaint paralleled the prophecy by accusing Congress of stepping beyond its constitutionally limited power to tax.4 The
Supreme Court, by unanimously reversing the opinion of the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming and upholding the constitutionality of the Act, 5 further extended the already broad discretion of Congress to
impose taxes pursuant to its constitutional power. Following Ptasynski, Congress may frame an excise tax in geographic terms as long as the geographic
classification used does not in fact discriminate against specific geographic
areas. 6 This comment will analyze Pasynski's consistency with previous
Supreme Court interpretations of the uniformity clause's 7 limitation on Congress' taxing power, and will discuss the decision's practical and legal
consequences.
II.
A.

FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION

The Alaskan Oil Exemption

On April 2, 1980, President Carter signed the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980,8 thereby setting into law a means for the federal govern1. P. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION A DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 242
(1980) (quoting William Symes, delegate to the Massachusetts State Assembly on the ratification of the Constitution).
2. I.R.C. §§ 4986-4998 (1982).
3. 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983).
4. Set Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Wyo. 1982), ,evld, 103 S. Ct.
2239 (1983).
5. See United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983), rev'g, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo.
1982).
6. See 103 S. Ct. at 2245.
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. This section provides in relevant part that "Congress
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises . . . but all Duties,
Imports and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.)
(1982)).
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ment to capture billions of dollars of revenue by taxing the "windfall profit"
realized on the production of decontrolled domestic oil. 9 Pursuant to Title I
of the Act,' ° different classifications of domestic oil are subject to tax rates
ranging from thirty to seventy percent. Il Each classification, or "tier," contains oil types defined by manner of production, quality of oil, or date production began from a well. 12 Essentially, though, four categories of crude oil
exist for purposes of the Act: taxable oil in tiers 1, 2, and 3, and exempt
oil.' 3 This last category contains six classifications of oil which are exempt
from "windfall profits" taxation, one of which is "exempt Alaskan oil." 14
The Alaskan oil exemption is the only exemption delineated solely by geographical terms.15 For domestic crude oil to be classified as exempt Alaskan
oil it must be obtained from a reservoir from which oil is being produced in
commercial quantities through a well located north of the Arctic circle, or
from a well located on the north side of the divide of the Alaskan-Aleutian
Range and at least seventy-five miles from the nearest point on the TransAlaska Pipeline System. 16
B.

The District Court's Decision

Six months after the effective date of the Act, independent oil producers
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming
alleging that the windfall profit tax was unconstitutional.' 7 The basis for
this claim was the uniformity clause,' 8 which prohibits excise taxes (such as
9. The "windfall profit" is the difference between a statutory base price and the higher
price at which domestic crude oil can be sold as a result of the gradual decontrol of crude oil
prices which began on June 1, 1979. See I.R.C. §§ 4988(a), (c)(1), 4989 (1982). This "windfall
profit" is the amount the Executive Branch believed would accrue to oil producers once domestic oil was deregulated; both President Carter and the Congress supported the imposition of an
excise tax on the production of domestic crude in order to divert the large profits created by
decontrol into a national energy program. See S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,1 (1980),
reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 413; H.R. REP. No. 304, 96th Cong., 2d Sess 2,
reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 589.
The government estimates that the net windfall profit tax revenue collected on domestic oil
from the inception of the tax through the end of the 1987 fiscal year will be approximately 76
billion dollars. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 8, United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct.
2239 (1983).
10. Title I of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-223, §§ 101103, 94 Stat. 229, 230-56 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 4986-4998, 6076, 6050C, 7421 (1982)).
11. See I.R.C. § 4987 (1982).
12. See id § 4991.
13. See id
14. See id.§ 4991(b)(3). The other categories of exempt oil are: oil from qualified governmental or charitable interests, Indian oil, front-end oil, exempt royalty oil, and exempt stripper
well oil.Id § 4991(1), (2),(4)-(6).
15. Compare id.§ 4994(e) (defining exempt Alaska oil) with id. § 4994(a)-(d), (f, (g)(defining other categories of exempt oil).
16. Id. § 4994(e). Exempt Alaskan oil does not include production from the Sadlerochit
reservoir on the Alaskan North Slope, an area rich in oil reserves and production. Id See also id.
§ 4996(d) (3).
Legislative history reveals that the Alaska exemption was enacted because Congress was
concerned that "taxation of this production would discourage exploration and development of
reservoirs in areas of extreme climatic conditions." JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 642, 656.
17. See 103 S. Ct. at 2242.
18. U.S. CONST.art I, § 8, cl.I.
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the windfall profit tax) which are not "uniform throughout the United
States." 19 Plaintiffs claimed that inclusion of the Alaskan oil exemption precluded the geographical uniformity required of an excise tax, rendering the
Act unconstitutional and entitling them to a refund of windfall taxes already
20
paid.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court concluded the issues
were ripe for review 2 1 and held that the "exempt Alaskan oil" provision rendered the Windfall Profit Tax Act unconstitutional when measured against
the uniformity clause. 22 The court recognized Congress' extensive power to
tax, but held that geographical uniformity, the constitutional limitation expressly and "unequivocally" applicable to excise taxes, was violated by the
Alaskan oil exemption. 23 Although the production and removal of crude oil
did not take place at the same time or in the same fashion in every state, that
fact was irrelevant because the uniformity clause's underlying principle of
geographical uniformity required that the Act operate "with the same force
and effect in every place where the subject of it is found."' 24 The court con25
cluded that the subject of the Act was the removal of domestic crude oil,
and that the uniformity clause required that the removal of crude oil be
taxed at the same rate regardless of where that activity took place. 26 The
Act violated this requirement because "[t]he Act, on its face, says that one
state, Alaska, is not subject to the same tax, at the same rate as all the other
states. "27

The district court rejected the United States' contention that a "rational justification" for the Alaskan oil exemption supported its validity.2 8
The court emphasized that to be legitimate, an exemption from a tax must
satisfy constitutional requirements. 29 Because the proposed exemption
30
would violate the constitutional requirement of geographical uniformity,
3
the proposed exemption was constitutionally unacceptable. 1
The court also rejected the United States' alternative argument that
19. Seesupra note 7. See Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Wyo. 1982),
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983).
20. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Wyo. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2239
(1983). Plaintiffs also alleged that the Act was an unconstitutional taking, and was irrational
legislation violating the due process clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
550 F. Supp. at 552. These issues were not decided by either the district court, td at 555, or the
Supreme Court, see 103 S. Ct. at 2240.
21. The United States contended that because no exempt Alaskan oil had been produced
during the period for which the refund was requested, the windfall profit tax had been uniformly applied during the relevant time frame. The court rejected that argument and said that
the absence of production was irrelevant. Rather, "[t]he lack of uniformity, in the Act itself,
exists now, and has existed since the Act was passed. This alone is sufficient for a finding that
the controversy before the Court is now appropriate for adjudication." 550 F. Supp. at 552.
22. Id. at 553.
23. Id
24. Id. (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 584 (1884)).
25. 550 F. Supp. at 553.
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id
30. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
31. 550 F. Supp. at 553.
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even if inclusion of the exempt Alaskan oil provision violated the uniformity
clause, that provision was severable, allowing the remaining sections of the
Act to stand as constitutionally valid. 32 The government maintained that
the general separability clause set forth in section 7852(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code 3 3 effected the validity of the remaining provisions in the
Act. 34 The court observed that it would have given a separability clause
specifically written into the Act "more deferential consideration,' 35 but held
that the general separability clause did not itself provide a suitable basis
upon which the rest of the Act could stand. 36 The court invoked legislative
intent as the acid test determinative of the exemption's separability, 37 and
concluded that because the Act would not have been passed without the
38
constitutionally infirm provision intact, the Act was void in its entirety.
The district court stayed the effect of its adjudication awaiting appellate
consideration. 39 Hence, no refunds were issued to plaintiffs and the windfall
profit tax continued to be collected pendente lite until a higher court ruled
upon the correctness of the trial court's decision. 4°
III.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
4

On direct appeal, ' the Court reversed the district court and held the
Act constitutional. 42 In reversing the district court's opinion, the Court
sanctioned the government's argument that Congress' decision to characterize apparently similar activities as distinctive for taxation purposes is an important factor when considering a tax's constitutionality under the
uniformity clause. 4 3 The Court held that the relevant inquiry under the
32. See id.at 555.
33. I.R.C. § 7852(a) (1982). This section provides that "[i]f any provision of this title, or
the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the
title, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby." Id
34. 550 F. Supp. at 554.
35. d
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id The court stated:
[I]t is. . .clear that the Alaska exemption was the result of negotiations and compromise, and that the Act as it exists today would not have been passed without the
invalid Alaska provision.
. .[[T]he exemption does carry sufficient import to justify a finding that its invalidation renders the entire Act void.
Id

at 554-55.

The court also cited another basis for its decision, the impermissibility of judicial legislation. If the Act was permitted to stand, the tax would have extended to all crude oil producers
in Alaska, which was a decision legislative in nature and beyond the scope of the judicial function. Id at 555.
39. Id at 556.
40. See Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 7 n.l 1, United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S.
Ct. 2239 (1983) (setting forth the Court's final amended judgment).
41. The Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction over this case by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1252
(1982). This statute authorizes an appellant to appeal directly to the Court from a final judgment of a United States court which holds an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional in a civil
action to which the United States is a party. Id
42. United States v. Ptasynski, 103 S. Ct. 2239 (1983), rev'g550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo.
1982).
43. See 103 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
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uniformity clause is not the words used to describe a tax classification, but is
whether "actual geographic discrimination" occurs when the classification is
framed in geographic terms. 44 Therefore, although Congress may frame an
excise tax classification in geographic terms, it must still adhere to the stricture that the tax must, in fact, operate with uniform effect in every state
45
where the subject of the tax is found.
The Court's rationale was dependent on both prior uniformity clause
decisions, and on its recent interpretations of the uniformity requirement in
the bankruptcy clause. 46 The Court began its analysis by observing that the
Head Money Cases47 and analogies had established beyond peradventure the
basic contours of uniformity clause analysis.4 8 At issue in the Head Money
Cases was the constitutionality of a duty levied against transportation com49
panies carrying foreign passengers entering the United States by boat.
Plaintiffs argued that unless the tax was also applied to foreign passengers
entering the United States by railroad or other land transport the tax was
unconstitutional for failing to operate with intrinsic equality, z~e. for failing
to act uniformly on all states and on all persons engaged in the business of
transporting passengers. 50 The Court squarely rejected this argument by
ruling that although an excise tax might operate unequally and thus be intrinsically disparate, a tax was constitutionally uniform when it operated
"with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is
found."'51 Defining the "subject" of the tax was, without question, the prerogative of Congress. 52 Consequently, although geographical considerations
played a role in determining which foreign passengers were to be subject to
taxation, 53 the tax was constitutional because it operated with precisely the
same effect in every place in the United States where the subject of the tax
(foreign passengers arriving by sea) was found. 54
In light of the principles of geographic uniformity and congressional
discretion announced in the Head Money Cases and reaffirmed in Knowlton v.
Moore,5 5 the Court framed the issue in Ptasynski as whether the uniformity
clause precluded the use of geographical terms to define a class of taxable
44. Id at 2245.
45. Id
4 provides that Congress shall have the power "To establish
46. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
. . .uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
47. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
48. See 103 S. Ct. at 2244.
49. 112 U.S. at 589.
50. Argument for Cunard Steamship Co., The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 583-84
(1884).
51. 112 U.S. at 594.
52. See id at 595 (citing State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 612 (1875) (holding that in
enacting tax statutes legislatures can draw distinctions between apparently similar classes)). Accord Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 521 (1899) (under the uniformity clause, classifications are
valid when they are based on reasonable ground and are not "arbitrary, based upon no real
distinction and entirely unnatural").
53. See 112 U.S. at 594 (recognizing that the "evil to be remedied . . . has no existence on
our inland borders, and immigration in that quarter needed no such regulation").
54.

55.

Id

178 U.S. 41 (1900).
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activities. 56 Although dictum in Downes v. Bizwel 5 7 unequivocally stated
that the uniformity clause proscribed tax statutes explicitly limiting their
operation to a specified geographic area, 58 the Court chose not to follow
Downes. 59 Having eliminated Downes as controlling precedent, the Court
acknowledged that although the purposes underlying the uniformity and
bankruptcy clauses were "not identical," the Court would look to the inter6
pretation of one to aid in the interpretation of the other. 0
The Regional Razl Reorganization Ac! Cases6 1 (3R Act Cases) were invoked
for the proposition that Congress may resolve geographically isolated
problems by enacting legislation applicable to only one region of the country. 62 In the 3R Act Cases one of the issues was whether a reorganization
statute, 6 3 which subjected bankrupt railroads undergoing reorganization in
a specified geographical region 64 to a unique set of reorganization laws, 6 5
violated the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause. 66 The Court
held that the statute did not violate the uniformity requirement because
there was no pending railroad reorganization proceeding outside the defined
region during the period that the Act applied. 6 7 Thus, the Act in fact operated uniformly throughout the United States upon all members of the class
of debtors and creditors affected: no creditor's right to obtain relief was re68
stricted by the regional limitation.
In explaining its decision to allow the legislation to stand despite the
limited class of debtors and creditors affected and despite the reorganization
act's limited geographic scope, the Court stated that the uniformity requirement did not deny Congress the power to take into consideration the differences that exist between different parts of the country when it attempts to
69
tailor bankruptcy legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems.
The Head Money Cases were cited to support this conclusion; 70 the Court read

56. 103 S. Ct. at 2244. See also id. at 2245 (observing that the Alaskan exemption was
merely a geographic description of an otherwise permissible tax classification).

57.

182 U.S. 244 (1901).

58. Id at 249 (Brown, J., concurring). In Downes the Court was asked to consider whether
the Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 48
U.S.C.), which imposed a duty only on goods brought into the United States from Puerto Rico
and vice versa, was violative of the uniformity clause. The Court upheld the tax, without a
majority opinion, on the ground that for purposes of the uniformity clause Puerto Rico was a
territory and therefore not a part of the United States. See generally 182 U.S. at 247 (Brown, J.,
concurring); id at 287 (White, J., concurring); id. at 345 (Gray, J., concurring). Justice Brown's
statements in Downes are therefore clearly dictum.
59. See 103 S. Ct. at 2244 n.12.
60. Id at 2244 n.13.
61. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
62. 103 S. Ct. at 2245.
63. Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1982).
64. See id. § 702(17).
65. Seeid. § 717; 3R Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 109-10.
66. 419 U.S. at 122. For text of the bankruptcy clause, see supra note 46.
67. Id. at 159-60. The Act's exclusive reorganization provisions could only be applied for a
180-day period following the Act's effective date. See 45 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982).
68. 419 U.S. at 160. Cf Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471
(1982) (legislation affecting only creditors of a single railroad violated the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause).
69. 419 U.S. at 161.
70. See id. at 160 (citing The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)).
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the Head Money Cases as interpreting the uniformity clause to permit geographically restricted legislation. 7 Because the Rail Act was also designed
to solve a geographically limited "evil," and had in fact been applied uniformly to all persons falling within its purview, the mere use of a geographic
72
term did not violate the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause.
Applying the principles of the Head Money Cases and the 3R Act Cases to
the Alaskan exemption, the Court held that the use of a geographical term to
3
describe the subject of an exemption did not violate the uniformity clause.7
The Court pointed to legislative history which showed that there were
unique technological and ecological problems associated with drilling for oil
in certain regions of Alaska.' 4 Congress was responding to a "geographically
isolated problem," ' 75 and enacted an exemption for oil wells subject to the
identified problems. Those wells were located above the Arctic Circle, or
north of the Alaskan-Aleutian Range and 75 miles from the nearest point on
the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline. 76 Because no other subjects which fell into this
category existed in any other state, the Act did not discriminate between
places where the subject of the classification was found. Therefore, the geographic uniformity test as articulated in the Head Money Cases had been met
and it mattered not that Congress had used a geographic term to identify the
tax classification; the classification was constitutional because its application
was znfact geographically uniform.' 7 The end result was couched in cautious terms, however. While the uniformity clause permits Congress "wide
latitude in deciding what to tax and does not prohibit it from considering
geographically isolated problems,' ' 7 8 geographically-framed tax classification must be examined "closely" to see if a classification reflects "actual geo79
graphic discrimination.'

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Introduction

By upholding the validity of a geographically-described tax classification, Ptasynskzi-to the federal government's immense relief-put the Court's
stamp of approval on the collection of enormous amounts of revenue. The
government estimated that the net windfall profit tax revenues would exceed
twenty-six billion dollars by the end of the 1982 fiscal year and that approximately fifty billion dollars in net revenues would be collected during the
71. See 419 U.S. at 161 (citing The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594 (recognizing that
the "evil" addressed by statute was geographically limited)),
72. 419 U.S. at 161.
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2245.
74. Id. at 2242 (citing JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMiTFEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 642, 656).
75. See 103 S. Ct. at 2245 n.14.
76. See id.at 2245.
77. Id The Court stated: "[h]ad Congress described this class of oil in nongeographic
terms, there would be no question as to the Act's constitutionality. We cannot say that identifying the class in terms of its geographic boundaries renders the exemption invalid." Id. at 2246.
78. Id at 2245.
79. Id.
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fiscal years of 1983-1988.80 This section, while noting the practical political
considerations which may have played a role in the Court's decision, will
concentrate on the decision's legal analysis.
B.

Geographic Uniformity Requirements in the Uniformity and Bankruptcy Clauses:
The Problems with Ptasynski
1.

The Bankruptcy Clause is not Analogous to the Uniformity
Clause

The Court in Ptasynski agreed that the general purpose of the uniformity clause is to limit the federal government's exercise of its commerce
power. 8 ' Conversely, the purpose giving rise to the bankruptcy clause was
the protection of discharged debtors in the federation of states.8 2 Thus, the
bankruptcy clause is a measure designed tofacilitate, rather than limit, Congress' power to promote commerce between states with different laws. 83 A
fortiori, the interpretation of one clause as a guideline for the interpretation
of the other is not altogether desirable.
While it is natural that the uniformity requirement in the bankruptcy
clause has been construed liberally in light of the clause's purpose, 84 it is not
proper to assume that the parameters of that clause's uniformity requirement conform with those of a uniformity requirement imposed as an express
limitation on Congress' power to tax. The fact that Congress may "fashion
legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems" when enacting bankruptcy laws, as long as the effect of the legislation is uniform throughout the
country, 8 5 comports with the broad construction of the clause needed to accommodate American commercial needs. The flexible standard of construction appropriate for the bankruptcy clause does not necessarily withstand
80. See supra note 9.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2243 (citing Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 103-06 (1900); 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 417-18 (rev. ed. 1937)).
82. See Nadelman, On the Origbi ofthe Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 224-25
(1957) (comprehensive review of the history and purpose of the bankruptcy clause).
83. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Madison's
discussion of the clause, in its entirety, reads:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with
the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different states, that the expediency of its seems
not likely to be drawn into question.
Id
84. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 158-59 (1974) (the Court
recognized the "flexibility inherent in the.., provision" and stated that "the uniformity clause
was not intended 'to hobble Congress by forcing it into nationwide enactments to deal with
conditions calling for remedy only in certain regions.' " (quoting In re Penn Central Transp.
Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 915 (Sp. Ct. R.R.R.A. 1974)); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 668 (1935) ("[qrom the beginning, the tendency of
legislation and . . . judicial interpretation has been uniformly in the direction of progressive
liberalization . . . of the bankruptcy power"); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122,
195 (1819) ("[t]he bankrupt law is said to grow out of the exigencies of commerce... (i)t is...
(a subject) on which the legislature may exercise an extensive discretion").
85. Compare Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 158-61 (1974) (upholding
statute giving equal treatment to similarly situated classes of creditors and debtors) with Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (striking down statute giving
special treatment to one segment of a group of similarly situated creditors).

1984]

UNITED STA TES v. PTASYNSKI

constitutional muster when applied to the uniformity clause, however. As
revealed by the clause's legislative history, the Framers were concerned that
either one state or a combination of states might muscle their industries (visa-vis congressional intervention) into a position of power at the expense of
another state's industries.8 6 To prevent that situation from occurring, the
uniformity clause was enacted expressly to limit Congress' ability to impose
indirect taxes upon targeted regions or states.87 The purpose and history of
the clause therefore reveal an intention to make the limitation on Congress'
taxing power absolute, without any circumstances suggesting the necessity or
propriety of an "inherent flexibility" in its application. Historically, rulings
by the Court have embodied this strict construction without exception, in88
cluding the Head Money Cases so heavily relied upon by the Ptasynski Court.
2. Ptasynski is not Justified by Existing Uniformity Clause Precedent
The Court in Ptasynskt"correctly cited the Head Money Cases for the proposition that an excise tax must apply at the same rate throughout the United
States wherever the subject of the tax is found.8 9 The Court then decided
that three significant factors reconciled the Alaskan exemption with the rule
of the Head Money Cases: 1) the Alaskan classification, although classified in
geographic terms, did not encompass the whole of Alaska; 9° 2) no other subjects of the group were found to exist in any other state; 9 ' and 3) the effect of
the statute in the Head Money Cases was to distinguish between geographic
92
regions, thereby giving that practice the imprimatur of constitutionality.
86. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 570-74 (2d ed. 1937). See also 2
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 428 (lst ed. 1833):
[The purpose of the clause] was to cut off all undue preferences of one state over
another in the regulation of subjects affecting their common interests. Unless . . .
excises were uniform, the grossest and most oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the
pursuits and employments of the people of different states, might exist. The agriculture, commerce or manufacture of one state might be built upon the ruins of those of
another; and a combination of a few states in congress might secure a monopoly of
certain branches of trade and business to themselves, to the injury, if not to the destruction, of their less favoured neighbors.
Id
87. 2 J. STORY, supra note 86, at 428. Mr. Justice Story's interpretation of the uniformity
clause echoed a statement made by North Carolina's Hugh Williamson after the ratification
debates:
The clear and obvious intention of the (uniformity clause) . . . was, that Congress
might not have the power of imposing unequal burdens; that it might not be in their
power to gratify one part of the Union by oppressing another . . .. I do not hazard
much in saying, that the present constitution had never been adopted without thlis
preliminary [guard] in it,
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 379 (1792).
88. See 103 S. Ct. at 2244.
89. Se Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 589, quoted in 103 S. Ct. at 2244.
90. See 103 S. Ct. at 2246.
91. See id. at 2241-42. The Court noted that certain exempt Alaskan oil was located in
offshore territorial waters not part of Alaska, and that the exemption was therefore not drawn
along "state political lines." Id. at 2242. Because Congress' taxing power is not subject to the
uniformity clause when applied to activities outside the United States, Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901); Mercury Press v. District Court, 173 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the practical
effect of the exemption, for Purposes of applying the uniformity clause, was to exempt only oil
found within Alaskan borders.
92. 103 S. Ct. at 2244.

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 61:2

In this case the subjects of the Windfall Profit Tax Act were different
classifications of domestic crude oil, one of which was "exempt Alaskan
oil." ' 93 One cannot quarrel with the conclusion that because the subject of
the classification was contained solely within Alaska, the tax operated with
"geographic uniformity." Such an approach, however, appears to beg the
question; by precise definition of classifications taxes can be restricted to particular states, with geographical uniformity following as a necessary result of
the classification.
Further, although the uniformity clause does not bar Congress from
choosing as a subject of a tax an activity which, as a matter of geographical
locus, exists only in certain states94 (as long as the requirement of geographic
uniformity is met), it seems to violate the purpose of the uniformity clause to
allow the subject of a tax or exemption to be chosen because of its geography.
Thus, the reasoning used in Pasynsk, although superficially consistent with
prior uniformity clause limitations, appears on a deeper level to deviate from
prior decisions.
3.

Ptasynski's "Rational Justification" Test Must Include a
Substantive Standard

A most critical development in Pasynski was the Court's implied acceptance of Congress' "rational justification" for a geographical designation as a
standard for measuring the constitutionality of a tax under the uniformity
clause. 95 Prior uniformity clause opinions have examined legislative considerations in order to arrive at "the evil to be remedied" by an indirect tax,
but have always based their determination of a tax's constitutionality solely
96
on whether the tax adheres to the principle of geographic uniformity.
Neither the legislative history nor purpose of the clause suggest that legislative considerations are permitted to justify the imposition of geographically
non-uniform taxes. Deference to congressional consideration, however,
clearly played a significant role in the outcome of Plasynski,9 7 and it is reasonable to conclude that the "rational justification" test will assume increasing importance in future decisions involving the uniformity clause.
The importance attributed by the Court to congressional considerations
in Plasynski is reminiscent of the deference with which Congress' rational
justification is treated in cases dealing with the constitutionality of legislation challenged as violating equal protection guarantees. A fundamental
distinction exists, however, between the constitutional restrictions imposed
through the uniformity and equal protection clauses. The uniformity clause
requires that geographic uniformity be used as the exclusive standard to test
93. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
94. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,109 (1900).
95. See 103 S. Ct. at 2246 (where Congress has exercised its "considered judgment" in
determining proper classifications in a complex field, the Court is reluctant to overturn a congressional decision).
96. E.g., Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927); Knowlton v. Moore, 173 U.S. 41 (1900);
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
97. See 103 S. Ct. at 2244 (the uniformity clause does not restrict congressional power to
draw tax classifications); id at 2246 (the Court is reluctant to disturb congressional classifications addressing complex taxation problems).
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the constitutionality of an arguably rational indirect tax. 98 The equal protection clause only requires that a classification scheme have some arguable
relation to the purpose for which it is made "and does not contain the kind
of discrimination against which the equal protection clause affords protection." 99 The uniformity clause, unlike the equal protection clause, therefore
includes a substantive standard against which congressional exercise of the
taxing power must be measured. The Court's treatment of that standard as
practically analagous to the equal protection standard subverts the purpose
of the uniformity clause.
V.

CONCLUSION

The major legal consequence arising out of Ptasynskz is an expansion of
Congress' power to impose indirect taxes. Concededly, the ability of Congress to frame tax classifications in geographic terms may not be a benefit of
enormous magnitude, given the Court's statement that it will scrutinize the
practical application of the tax to prevent geographic discrimination.10 0
The practical advantages of this new rule, however, are exemplified by the
billions of dollars in revenue which Congress is now able to reap despite the
faulty draftsmanship which endangered the Act and its operation.
Plasynski also leaves Congress less encumbered in its taxing power as a
consequence of the Court's reluctance to review legislative decisions. The
Court's deference has spawned a rational basis test of sorts which will very
likely be significant in future uniformity clause challenges. Essentially, the
interests of the congressional majority may now play a determinative role in
the outcome of such challenges.
Finally, Pasynski left no doubt that the Court will continue to apply the
liberally construed uniformity standard of the bankruptcy clause to uniformity clause cases. This trend will be responsible for a movement away from
the absolute geographic uniformity requirement which has characterized the
uniformity clause standard in the past.
Ellen Eggleston

98. E.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1901); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580
(1884).
99. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
100. 103 S. Ct. at 2245.

